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Modern threats to international peace and security from so 
called “Hybrid Threats”, multimodal threats such as cyber war, 
low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism etc. 
which involve a diverse and broad community of affected 
stakeholders involving both regional and international 
organisations/structures, also pose further questions for the 
existing legacy of Nuremberg. The (perhaps unsettling) question 
arises of whether our present concept of “war and peace”, with 
its legal pillars of the United Nations Charter’s Articles 2(4), 51, 
and the notion of the criminality of waging aggressive war based 
on the “legacy” of Nuremberg has now become outdated to 
respond to new threats arising in the 21st century. This article 
also serves to warn that one should not use the definition of 
aggression, adopted at the ICC Review Conference in Kampala 
in 2010, to repeat the most fundamental flaw of Nuremberg:  ex 
post facto criminalisation of the (unlawful) use of force. A 
proper understanding of the “legacy of Nuremberg” and a 
cautious reading of the text of the ICC definition of aggression 
provide some markers for purposes of the debate on the impact 
of new threats to peace and security and the use of force in 
international law and politics. 
 
Les menaces modernes à la paix et à la sécurité internationales, 
par exemple les menaces dites « hybrides », les menaces 
multimodales comme la cyberguerre, les conflits asymétriques 
de faible intensité et le terrorisme mondial, qui impliquent un 
groupe vaste et diversifié d’intervenants provenant de structures 
et d’organismes régionaux ou internationaux, remettent en 
cause l’héritage du procès de Nuremberg. Se pose également la 
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question (peut-être troublante) de savoir si la notion actuelle de 
« guerre et paix » ancrée juridiquement dans le paragraphe 2(4) 
et l’article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies et la 
criminalisation de la guerre d’agression fondée sur 
l’« héritage » du procès de Nuremberg demeure encore 
pertinente en ce qui concerne la réponse aux menaces du 
21
e
 siècle. Le présent article sert également à prévenir qu’il ne 
faut pas utiliser la définition du terme « crime d’agression » 
adoptée à la Conférence de révision du Statut de Rome (ayant 
instauré la Cour pénale internationale (CPI)), qui a eu lieu à 
Kampala en 2010, pour reproduire la lacune la plus 
fondamentale du procès de Nuremberg : la criminalisation a 
posteriori du recours (illégal) à la force. Une compréhension 
adéquate de l’héritage du procès de Nuremberg et une lecture 
prudente de la définition du terme « crime d’agression » de la 
CPI fournissent des balises au débat sur l’incidence des 
nouvelles menaces à la paix et à la sécurité, ainsi qu’à 
l’utilisation de la force en politique et en droit internationaux. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW 
 
The unfolding events of the “Jasmine Revolution” in North Africa during the so 
called “Arab Spring”
1
 of 2011 challenged and even changed the political landscape 
in the Maghreb, the Arab and the Mid-Eastern world. While some of the protests 
led, with the deposition of Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak 
in Egypt, to actual regime change and a move towards freedom and democracy, 
other states in the regions have been less fortunate and saw a backlash of the “old 
order” of autocratic governments as witnessed in the cases of Bahrain and Syria. 
In late October 2011, the conflict in Libya had come to an end with its leader (de 
facto president) Muammar al-Gaddafi (who officially held no public office in 
Libyan Jamahiriya) killed and a new transitional government, the National 
Transitional Council [NTC], in power. This was the outcome of a seven month 
conflict with sixth months of intensive close air support by NATO air power, 
enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)
2
: the future 
will tell how successful in terms of democratisation and self-determination the de 
facto “regime change” in Libya will turn out to be. The prolonged and costly 
military engagement in Libya highlighted how quickly NATO and the European 
Union could be drawn into military combat operations, unofficially referred to as 
“kinetic operations”, when asked or compelled to contribute militarily to peace 
and security stabilization operations in the region in order to stop the commission 
of widespread human rights violations (as evidenced in Libya).   
 This foreign, mostly western, military response to a developing “humanitarian 
crisis” on the ground constitutes one of the most recent examples of the use of 
military force in the wider context of war – albeit authorized by the United 
                                                          
1  Aptly reiterating the hopes associated with the Prague spring of 1968 which after an initial period 
of hope for democratic change led to the military crushing by Soviet led invasion forces. 
2  UN S/RES/1973 (2011), which was adopted after the Arab League asked the United Nations in a 
resolution of 12 March 2011 to establish and enforce such a “no fly zone” in Libya to protect 
Libyan civilians in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
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Nations Security Council under Chapter VII United Nations Charter – involving 
NATO assets in this century. At the beginning of the previous decade, it was 
“9/11” (as the attacks on 11 September 2001
3
 on the United States of America 
were called), which led to the present so-called “war on terror”, which so far has 
seen two military campaigns
4
 of doubtful legality
5
 under international law: 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” in 2001
6
 was followed by “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom” in 2003.
7
 The legality of both campaigns, including the invasion and 
subsequent “regime-change” in the case of Iraq by the US-led coalition, will be 
subjected to legal debate for years to come.
8
 Despite this, and on-going inquiries 
(such as the UK Iraq inquiry)
9
, it seems rather unlikely that there will be any 
(international) criminal law action for the crime of aggression taken against any 
individual leader for having planned and/or ordered the invasion of Iraq. This 
omission has to be seen against the backdrop of the Nuremberg trials of 1945 and 
their continuing legacy as enshrined in the Nuremberg Principles of 1950. While 
this legacy informed various domestic and international prosecutions of crimes 
under international law such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, 
the crime of aggression basically became a very contentious debating point, but 
with no prosecutions for this crime during the decades following the trials at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. The (legal) dynamics changed somewhat with the adoption 
of the Resolution on Aggression at the Kampala Review Conference of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2010.  
 This article asks the question whether “9/11” and the subsequent “war on 
terror” has changed our perception of the overall legacy of the Nuremberg trials in 
                                                          
3  Referring to the infamous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, executed by 
mostly Saudi-born terrorists of the Al-Qaeda network, which took place on 11-09-2001, in which 
some 3000 people lost their lives. C.f. Dominic McGoldrick, From “9-11” to the Iraq War 2003: 
International Law in an age of complexity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 9-11; also referred to 
as 9/11 attacks. 
4  The US led military campaign in Afghanistan since autumn 2001 was named “Operation 
Enduring Freedom” [OEF] and targets remaining Taliban and Al-Qaeda structures; as well OEF 
operates the UN mandated international assistance mission of the International Security and 
Assistance Force [ISAF], see  Security Council Resolution 1386. The second on-going military 
operation takes place in Iraq and is called “Operation Iraqi Freedom” [OIF].  
5  For critical comments, see Johan D van der Vyver “us contra bellum and American foreign 
policy” (2003) 28 SAYB Int’l L 1; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope “Slouching towards new 
‘just’ wars:  international law and the use of force after September 11th” (2004) 51 Nethl Int’l L 
Rev 363. 
6  See Don Kritsiotis , On the jus ad bellum and jus in bello of Operation Enduring Freedom: 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 2002 (Washington, DC: The 
American Society of International Law, 2002) 35. 
7  For a commentary and legal analyses of the Iraq War, see American Society of International Law, 
Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict (Washington, DC: The American Society of International 
Law, 2004); McGoldrick, supra note 3 at 47-51 for a comprehensive discussion of the legal 
debate on the Iraq War and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann & Gerhard Kemp, “The international 
crime of aggression in the context of the global “war on terror”: some legal and ethical 
perspectives” (2010) 2 Journal of South African Law 309  
8  Which was neither explicitly authorised by the UN Security Council, nor an apparent act of self-
defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. For comments on the legality of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, see Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H Oxman eds, “Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq 
Conflict” (2003) 97:3 AJIL 553; McGoldrick, supra note 3. 
9  The Iraq Inquiry was officially launched on 30 July 2009 and continues up to this day, see online: 
The Iraq Inquiry <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/>.  
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respect to the crime against peace as enshrined in Article 6 (a) of the Nuremberg 
Charter, which has become a substantial part of the crime of aggression under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (now provided for in Article 8bis 
adopted at the Kampala Review Conference and which will enter into force at the 
earliest in 2017). New, modern threats to global peace and security stemming from 
so called “Hybrid Threats”,
10
 such as cyber war, low intensity asymmetric conflict 
scenarios, global terrorism, organized crime and piracy affect and involve a 
diverse and broad community of stakeholders at both the regional and international 
level and also pose further questions for the legacy of Nuremberg. The (perhaps 
unsettling) question arises of whether our present concept of “war and  peace” 
with its legal pillars of the United Nations  Charter’s Articles 2(4), 51, and an 
underdeveloped notion of the criminality of waging aggressive war, based on the 
“legacy” of Nuremberg, has not become outdated to respond to new threats arising 
in the 21
st
 century. Our question is furthermore based on the assumption that new 
powerful (non-Western) role-players will have their own imprint on the 
development of what might become the 21
st
 century jus contra bellum:  a sceptical 
view of the use of armed force to further universalist or liberal goals and ideas 
such as “humanitarian intervention” (or more bluntly, regime change posing as 
human rights intervention), or indeed expansive notions of self-defence under the 
rubric of the “war on terror”. The idea here is germinal indeed, but a necessary 
preliminary in order to proceed with the basic criticism of the Nuremberg legacy 
as essentially inadequate in terms of the new threats to peace and security. 
 This article
11
 consists of three parts: firstly, it summarizes briefly the major 
arguments and criticism which were originally directed at the legality of the crime 
against peace under Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter and the subsequent 
principles VI and VII of the Nuremberg Principles
12
 as the legal precursors to the 
crime of aggression under the Rome Statute. It is not the intention of the authors to 
question at length the legality or even morality of the Nuremberg trials as such but 
to discuss the legacy of the Nuremberg trials and their impact on the development 
of the (new) law of aggression post World War II. Secondly, a summary of the 
                                                          
  10  NATO describes these Hybrid Threats as those posed by adversaries, with the ability to 
simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their 
objectives  – NATO has identified these threats and established a concept framework, the so 
called Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats [MCCHT] which aims at identifying a 
wider comprehensive multi-stakeholder response, see BI-SC Input for a New NATO Capstone 
Concept for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Enclosure 1 to1500/CPP-
CAM/FCR/10270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated 25 August 2010). For 
general information on the NATO CHT experiments see online: NATO 
<http://www.act.nato.int/top-headlines/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat>. The author took part 
in this experiment in 2011 as NATO Rule of Law subject matter expert [SME].  
11  The authors have undertaken some prior work in that field. For a general background see, 
Bachmann & Kemp supra note 7.  Sascha Dominik Bachmann, “Today’s quest for international 
criminal justice - a short overview of the present state of criminal prosecution of international 
crimes” in Noëlle Quénivet & Shilan Shah-Davis, eds, International Law and Armed Conflict: 
Challenges in the 21st Century (Netherlands: TMC Asser Instituut, 2010) and Gerhard Kemp 
“Constitutionalization and the International Criminal Court:  Whither individual criminal liability 
for aggression?” (2008) 4 SALJ 694. 
12  To cite Franz B Schick, an early rapporteur and writer on the Nuremberg trials: “not to imply [...] 
that the moral war guilt of Germany’s political leaders has not been established beyond any doubt 
whatsoever [...] but to demonstrate [...] legal difficulties...” in “Crimes Against Peace” (1948) J 
Crim L & Criminology 445 at 449. 
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present state of the codification of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court after the 2010 Kampala conference reflects on 
the legacy of Nuremberg from a contemporary and critical perspective. Thirdly, 
this article concludes with a brief outlook on new dimensions of possible future 
threats to peace and security as challenges to our present concept of war and peace 
and reflects on possible responses. 
 
II. THE CRIME AGAINST PEACE AND THE LAW OF NUREMBERG: 
LEGALITY AND CRITICISM 
 
The four great nations flushed with victory and stung with 
injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their 
captive enemies to the judgment of law.
13
 
 
A. Introduction 
 World War II cost approximately 55 million human lives, mostly civilian non-
combatants as victims of direct targeted annihilation and of as what is today 
referred to in the technical language of armed conflict as “collateral damage”, and 
saw the commission of widespread human rights atrocities by all sides. It was, 
however, Nazi Germany’s aggressive wars waged in Europe, the commission of 
mass human rights violations such as the murder in concentration and 
extermination camps, the Holocaust, and war crimes which led to the 
establishment of the International
14
 Military Tribunal [IMT] of Nuremberg in 1946 
as a manifestation of a unified allied approach to international post war justice. 
The United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France as the 
four victor powers of World War II, who, reflecting on the failed Leipzig trials 
two decades before, opted against any German involvement in the prosecution of 
the major war criminals.
15
 Consequently, an allied tribunal
16
 was established, 
following the joint declaration
17
 of the “London Agreement of 8 August 1945 for 
                                                          
13  See Joe J Heydecker & Johannes Leeb. The Nuremberg Trial: A History of Nazi Germany as 
Revealed through the Testimony at Nuremberg, translated by RA Downie. (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958) at 534. 
14  Judges and prosecution consisted of allied personnel alone. The fact that no member of a 
“neutral” state was allowed to participate in the trials already questions the nature of the 
international military tribunal as being “international”. 
15  See LawReport of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and prepared by the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission 1947-1949 at Volume IX referring to the fact that the Leipzig court cases 
had shown that the prosecution of war criminals before their own domestic courts did not achieve 
the desired effect of establishing the factual context of the committed crimes and deterrence. On 
the other hand the example of German Nazi trials post-1949 show that a successful prosecution 
could have taken place based on German law which was in existence at the time the crimes were 
committed, see Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, “The legacy of the Nuremberg Trials – 60 years on” 
(2007) 3 Journal of South African Law at 545. 
16  The Tokyo tribunal was established in 1946 and had jurisdiction over crimes committed by the 
Japanese in the Far East. Its jurisdiction, procedure and powers followed the Nuremberg Charter. 
It sentenced twenty-five Japanese war criminals out of the original twenty-eight accused. See 
Steven R Ratner & Jason S Abrams Accountability For Human Rights Atrocities In International 
Law-Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 189.  
17  The Allied Powers had already declared in their Moscow declaration of 30 October 1943 
“Concerning Responsibility of Hitlerites for Committed Atrocities” their intent to try all German 
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the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis”
18
 
which called for the “just and prompt” trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of Germany.
19
  The United States’ determination to grant the defendants 
a fair trial had eventually overcome initial, more “revanchist” approaches to 
justice
20
, such as Stalin’s suggestion to execute summarily 50,000 German military 
staff as war criminals as a means of criminal justice.
21
 This post-World War II 
criminal ad hoc tribunal (together with its military-judicial counterpart in Tokyo) 
established a new notion of individual accountability for the individual 
perpetrators of crimes under international law. But even 65 years later, questions 
still remain about the legality and legacy of these trials:
22
 whether the law of 
Nuremberg
23
 resembled “new” retroactive law which may have been contrary to 
the legality principle evident in international law at that time. 
 
B. The legality of the IMT and the criticism of retroactive law 
 Some criticism of the IMT centered around the possible nature of the 
Nuremberg trials as so called “victors’ justice” and as the “prosecution of World 
War II’s losing parties by the victors”
24
 as resembling a legal “framework... 
established to exclude the crimes of the Allied Powers”.
25
 One of the main 
criticisms of the Nuremberg Charter and of the later judgments of the IMT was 
                                                                                                                                     
war criminals, text available from Yale University’s Avalon Project online:  Yale Law School 
<http://avalon.law.yale.edu/w-wii/moscow.asp>. 
18  The (London) Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal 82 UNTS 280, (entered into 
force 8 Aug 1945) [London Agreement]. 
19  Ibid, art 1. 
20  See art 1, 16 of the Nuremberg Charter. It was mostly the United States that urged the other three 
powers to follow this principle (and that the understanding of justice somehow differed among the 
powers: e.g. did the British favour the idea of executing all German leaders without a formal trial? 
See Justin Hogan-Doran & Bibi T van Ginkel “Aggression as a Crime Under International Law 
and the Prosecution of Individuals by the Proposed International Criminal Court” (1996) 43:3 
Nethl Int’l L Rev 331 ff.  Stalin favoured this procedure as well but suggested a pro forma trial in 
the tradition of the Soviet purgation trials of the thirties. See Johan Steyn “Guantanamo Bay: The 
Legal Black Hole” (2004) 9 ICLQ  at 33. 
21  Yves Beigbeder, Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice (London: 
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1999) at 31 and Heydecker & Leeb, supra note 13 at 78.   
22  Referring to the original IMT, plus the subsequent trials under CCL No 10. 
23  Consisting of the London Agreement, supra note 18, the Nuremberg Charter and its subsequent 
Control Council Law No. 10 of Dec 1945. 
24  See e.g. Neli J Kritz “Coming to terms with atrocities: a review of accountability mechanisms for 
mass violations of human rights” (1996) 59 Law and Contemp Probs 130; Beigbeder, supra note 
21 at 39. 
25  See KC Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2008) at 37. Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival-America’s Quest For 
Global Dominance (New York: Macmillan, 2003), 21ff characterizes the international military 
tribunal trials as trials which were following the principle that “victors do not investigate their 
own crimes” and as such excluded  the allied bombing of the German civilian population for 
example. Another example of such one-sided victors’ justice was the infamous example of the 
execution of up to 15,000 Polish prisoners of war by the Soviets in 1940, during the so called 
Katyn massacre. The Soviets tried unsuccessfully to hold Germany accountable for this crime and 
included it in the indictment of Göring and others. See Winston Churchill, The Second World 
War-Volume IV-The Hinge of Fate (London: Cassell, 1951) at 681 and Quincy Wright “The law 
of the Nuremberg trial” (1947) 41:1 AJIL at 38, 44 for an early account of this criticism. 
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based on the assumption that the law of Nuremberg possibly violated the legality 
principle and non-retroactivity doctrine in criminal law often described in terms of 
the maxims nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege.
26
 Other causes of 
criticism were related issues such as the “ex post facto” nature of the Nuremberg 
Charter’s codification, the use of legal analogies and the existence of legal 
ambiguities (which will not be discussed in this article). Nuremberg was the 
product of a political-legal approach, taken by the Allied victors in World War II 
to end criminal impunity of waging aggressive war based on the sobering 
observation that there was “no general prohibition in international law against the 
waging of war.”
27
 Reisman (with reference to the post-war responses) describes the 
interdependence of the illegality of using aggressive war and the need for criminal 
sanctions of such actions:  
 
The first was a political response to aggression:  the United 
Nations Charter prohibited “the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state” and 
authorized the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.” The second was a criminal 
justice response to aggression:  the victors established 
international tribunals for finding “individual responsibility” for 
“planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression.”
28
 
 
The law of Nuremberg constituted law which had been imposed on the defeated 
enemy state of Germany. Consequently, the question had to be asked whether the 
four victor powers had the necessary legitimacy to enact the Nuremberg Charter 
as new law. The following arguments sum up the view that the creation of the 
Nuremberg Charter did not violate international law, or was, at least, justifiable: 
 
1. The assumption of the unlimited legislative, judicial and 
administrative jurisdiction over the German territory and its 
people by the allied control council after the factual “debellatio” 
of Germany through the four victorious powers, made the 
absence of an international treaty with Germany under the 
prevailing circumstances, acceptable to the international 
community.
29
 
 
                                                          
26  These principles state as requirements for any criminal prosecution that the crimes in question 
were qualified as a crime or criminal act by an existing law at the time of their commission, see 
Claus Kress “Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege”, online: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law 4, 5 online: Max Planck Encyclopedia <http://www.mpepil.com> for an 
account of the post WW II critique. 
27  W Michael Reisman “Introduction: The Definition of Aggression and the ICC’ (2002) 96 ASIL 
Proceedings at 181. 
28  Ibid. 
29  See Hans Kelsen “The Rule against Ex Post Facto Laws and the Prosecution of the Axis War 
Criminals” (1945) 2 The Judge Advocate Journal at 11. 
240 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 2012 
 
2. The IMT had jurisdiction ratione personae over individuals only 
and not over Germany as a state. The subjecting of individuals to 
a foreign jurisdiction did not require the consent of Germany as 
the state of origin of these individuals.
30
 
 
Contemporary practice of establishing international criminal tribunals to prosecute 
individual perpetrators of international crimes resembles not only a lawful means 
for the United Nations Security Council’s powers to respond directly to a threat to 
the peace as stipulated in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
31
 but 
even a duty in terms of the duty to protect civilians
32
 from the commission of the 
core crimes.
33
  This practice follows directly the Nuremberg precedent of creating 
a tribunal to adjudicate crimes under international law. Such actions are freed from 
the necessity to obtain prior consent of the states affected.
34
 The jurisdiction of 
these ad hoc international tribunals derives directly from Security Council 
resolutions and/or multilateral treaties.  
 The establishment of the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda were such United Nations Chapter VII actions of the Security Council. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established as the result of genuine 
cooperation
35
 between the United Nations and a specific state in prosecuting 
human rights violations before an international hybrid forum. The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court of 1998 requires in general voluntary accession as 
a precondition for the exercise of its jurisdiction and allows only one “coerced” 
option for the exercise of jurisdiction as stipulated by Article 13 (b) of its Statute.
36
 
 The law of Nuremberg resembled new, “retroactive”, law in the sense that it 
was codified after the commission of the crimes in question for the purpose of 
holding the German military and political leaders ex post facto criminally 
                                                          
30  See Wright, supra note 25 at 46 with reference to case law on the judicial competence of courts 
and state sovereignty. 
31  Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations of June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, TS 993, 3 
Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, provides for measures in the connection to 
“Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. 
32  C.f. the UN evolving doctrine of the responsibility to protect (R2P), see e.g. the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, UN doc. A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, paras 138 to 139. 
33  Such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; with the responsibility to protect 
outlined in the UNSG Report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN doc. A/63/677 of 
12 January 2009. 
34  Chapter VII measures can thus overrule sovereignty of the state in question. See Prosecutor v 
Tadic 1995 case no. IT-94-1-AR72, 1162 at para 27.  
35  See Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000. UN Doc S/RES/1315. 
36  Article 13 (b) allows the referral of “a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to 
have been committed […] to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations”. Examples hereof are the 2010 indictment of the Sudanese 
President Al-Bashir (Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09) as 
consequence of an earlier UN SC referral of the Darfur, Sudan, human rights crisis to the 
international criminal court under Security Council resolution 1593 (2005). The recent request by 
the ICC prosecutor to the ICC for issuing an arrest warrant for the Libyan leader al-Qadhafi and 
one of his sons is such an exception in terms of Article 13 (b), see International Criminal Court, 
“Press Release”, ICC-CPI-20110516-PR667, “ICC Prosecutor: Gaddafi used his absolute 
authority to commit crimes in Libya” (16 May 2011) online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/1365E3B7-8152-4456-942C-A5CD5A51E829.htm>. 
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accountable, as explicitly stated in Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter.
37
 The 
ex post facto nature of the law of Nuremberg would constitute a violation of 
international law in the absence of applicable exceptions. The law of Nuremberg 
itself could provide such an exception because as Kelsen points out that “the 
application of unknown law is not without exceptions. The rule is effective only 
with respect to legislation, not against the creation of law by custom or judicial 
decisions”.
38
 Given this, the question arises whether such an exception could have 
been found in the existence of custom(s) criminalizing certain acts at the time of 
their commission by the accused. If that was the case, the fact that the law of 
Nuremberg had been new and retroactive law would not constitute a violation of 
international law thanks to the existence of such a customary law exception. 
 
C. The legality of the retroactive crime against peace – selective justice or 
international criminal justice in progression? 
 Acts of “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreements...” which would today qualify 
as the crime of aggression (under Article 8bis of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
which is not in operation yet) were criminalised as so called “crimes against 
peace” under Article 6(a) Nuremberg Charter.
39
 
 Examples of such crimes against peace were the German attack on Poland in 
September 1939 or the attack on “neutral” Denmark in 1940.
40
 This crime 
constituted a “leadership” crime and was used to prosecute members of the 
German military high command
41
 as well as the political leadership which had 
been involved in the decision-making processes before and during the war. 
 Such crimes against peace were criminalized for the first time in the 
Nuremberg Charter: prior hereto and until the outbreak of World War I, the 
“right” of a state to resort to war, the jus ad bellum, was most widely regarded 
only as “a mere continuation of [state] politics by other means”.
42
 With the end of 
the first global war in 1918 this perception changed:  war had become an outlawed 
means of inter-state affairs. The victors of World War I, the so called “Entente” 
powers, condemned aggressive war in Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles of 
1919 as a “supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of 
treaties” and contemplated trying the German Emperor, William II of 
Hohenzollern, responsible for the crime of waging war by siding with the Austrian 
                                                          
37  Article 6 “whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.” See 
Werner Renz’s essay, “Völkermord als Strafsache. Vor 35 Jahren sprach das Frankfurter 
Schwurgericht das Urteil im großen Ausschwitz-Prozess”, online: Fritz Bauer Institute  
<http://www.fritz-bauer-institut.de/texte/ess-ay/08-00_renz.htm>, 6 ff.  
38  Kelsen, supra note 29 at 9. 
39  See discussion of Art. 8bis Rome Statute below. 
40  Whether the Franco-British declaration of war on Germany of 3 September 1939 as a 
consequence of the German attack on Poland falls within the wider category of a crime against 
peace is debatable, the same question arises in the context of the Soviet attack on Poland in the 
second half of September 1939 as part of the Soviet German Molotov – Ribbentrop Non-Aggre-
ssion Pact, the Soviet aggression in 1939 and finally the failed Anglo-British landings in (then 
neutral) Norway, the latter action which would today fall under today’s terminology of “pre-
emptive” self-defence. 
41  The OKW, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the High Command of the then German defence 
force. 
42  Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Book I trans by Col JJ Graham (London: N Trübner, 1873) at 24. 
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and Hungarian Empire in declaring war on the Kingdom of Serbia in August 1914. 
The attack on the neutral Kingdom of Belgium was regarded as such a crime 
against peace. A prosecution of the Kaiser for aggression was regarded as a 
possible application of retroactive law
 43
 and consequently dropped.
 
 The Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 condemned but did not 
criminalise the unlawful resort to war and promoted peaceful means of conflict 
resolution.
44
 Possible collective enforcement could – in theory – utilise economic 
sanctions and even military actions.
45
 
 The Kellogg-Briand Treaty (or Paris Treaty)
46
 of 1928 was a further step to 
outlaw war: it renounced war as a legitimate instrument of any state policy.
47
 
Unlike the Versailles Treaty of 1919, which constituted a victor’s “peace treaty” 
necessary for ascertaining “war guilt”, the Paris Treaty resembled a multilateral 
treaty with voluntary membership. The Paris Treaty was not very successful in 
terms of keeping the peace: the internationalisation of the Spanish “civil war” in 
1936 to 1939,
48
 Italy’s Abyssinian campaign of 1937 the German attack on Poland 
in September 1939, and aggressive Japanese imperialism, showed an apparent lack 
of willingness to comply with these noble treaty resolutions. 
 Some early attempts to criminalize war can be seen in the 1923 Draft Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance of the League of Nations and the (non ratified) League of 
Nations’ Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the so called 
“Geneva Protocol”, of 1924. Article 1 of the Assistance Treaty states “that 
aggressive war is an international crime,” and that the parties would “undertake 
that no one of them will be guilty of its commission.”
49
 The Geneva Protocol 
provided that “a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and is 
an international crime.”
50
  
 In the absence of binding criminal law principles, the acts of planning, 
preparing and finally waging war against Poland in 1939 would not have qualified 
as crimes under international law but nevertheless as collusion in acts leading to 
breaches of international law resulting in inter-state (tort) responsibility with 
reparations for the offending state, as witnessed in the seminal Chorzow Factory 
                                                          
43  Moghalu, supra note 25 at 22. Other attempts to try him for war crimes were also futile and the 
German Emperor was, eventually to die in Dutch exile in 1941. 
44  See “Preamble” of the Covenant of the League of Nations; Antonio Cassese, International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 37.  
45  Covenant of the League of Nations, articles 11 and 16 respectively – the League’s sanctions 
against Mussolini’s Fascist Italy in the mid-thirties for its war of aggression in Abyssinia was the 
only more notable peace enforcement action by the League and directly led to the advent of the 
German–Italian detente and eventual coalition. 
46  Kellogg-Briand Treaty (27 August1928). 
47  Art 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty “condemn[s] recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one 
another”  
48  While the UK and France adapted– officially a policy of non-intervention, the Nationalists under 
Franco enjoyed Italian, German and partly US support, while the USSR supported the Republican 
side. 
49  Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Article 1 
50  “Preamble”, Geneva Protocol. The protocol was recommended to the members of the League but 
never ratified.  
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case before the Permanent Court of Justice in 1927.
51
 This view is supported in the 
findings of the sub-committee of the legal committee of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission [UNWCC] in its majority report of 1945 whereby “acts 
committed by individuals merely for the purpose of preparing and launching 
aggressive war, are lege lata, not “war crimes”.
52
  The decision to establish 
criminal accountability before the IMT in the end followed the overall consensus, 
whereas, acts of crimes against peace “are of such gravity that they should be 
made the subject of a formal condemnation in the peace treaties. It is desirable that 
for the future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages (...)”
53
 
This view was confirmed in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 95 (I) 
in 1946.
54
  
 As explained above, the law of Nuremberg regarded these offences as crimes 
under existing (customary) international law principles and not just as non-
punishable violations of international law. The IMT based this view on basically 
two arguments: firstly that the Nuremberg Charter constituted the expression and 
manifestation of international law in existence at the time of its creation and as 
such contributed directly to the formation of (new) international law;
55
 and, 
secondly, that punishment for crimes which were not punishable/prosecutable at 
the time of their commission should be allowed if the absence of punishment 
would otherwise appear to be “unjust”:
56
 
 
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of 
treaties and assurances have attacked neighbouring states 
without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances 
the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it 
being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were 
allowed to go unpunished
57
  
 
Following the above-mentioned UNWCC majority report and the comments by 
Kelsen
58
 it has to be concluded that at the time of the commission of the respective 
acts, individual criminal responsibility for the act of resorting to the use of force 
could not have been legally established under international law: firstly because of 
a lack of precise multilateral criminal provisions, secondly a respective customary 
law provision did not exist at the time of their commission and thirdly because of 
the non-retroactivity principle as a non-derogable principle of international law 
                                                          
51  See Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 9; the PCIJ was the 
predecessor of the International Court of Justice. 
52  UN War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the 
Development of the Law of War (London: HMSO,1948) at 182. 
53  Ibid. 
54  See UN Doc A/ 64/ ADD.1. 
55  Kress, supra note 26 at 4; Cassese, supra note 44 at 440, citing a defence motion during the IMT 
hearings, in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Nuremeberg, 1947), Nuremeberg I, at 168-9. 
56  Cassese, Ibid at 439-440 (reference to a discussion among the Allies at that time). 
57  Trial of German War Criminals (Judgment) Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (30 
September and 1 October) 41 AJIL (1947) reproduced in B Ferencz, An International Criminal 
Court, Vol I, (Sydney: Oceana Publications, 1980) at 477. 
58  See Kelsen, supra note 29 at 10.  
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and whose derogation was not covered by one of the exceptions discussed above 
by Kelsen.  
 The fact alone that the IMT, as a legal predecessor to the current international 
tribunals, was forced on defeated Germany with obvious disregard and 
indifference to her sovereignty and jurisdiction had to lead eventually to questions 
re: its legality and overall impact. Following the rationale of Kelsen, this legality 
“deficit” in respect to the crime against peace continues to exist unless and until 
subsequent universal acceptance and actual usage of proceedings and findings of 
the IMT in the form of the Nuremberg principles
59
 as part of customary 
international law
60
 occur, thus legitimizing the law of Nuremberg under 
international law as part of customary international law. Custom requires both 
usus and opinio juris; state practice and a corresponding view among states.  
 The law lords of the (former) House of Lords (the new Supreme Court) took 
the view in their judgment in R v Jones (2006)
61
 that individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression could be based on customary 
international law developed since the coming into force of the Nuremberg Charter 
in 1945, notwithstanding the absence of any international codification of the crime 
of aggression (that is prior to the Kampala Review Conference, discussed below). 
Authors and commentators generally agree with this characterization of aggression 
as a crime under customary international law, albeit with a narrow and not 
expansive scope.
62
 
 The legacy of Nuremberg and the failure/reluctance to make observance of the 
Nuremberg Principles the mandatory yardstick of our foreign and security policy 
continue to affect modern day attempts to effectively criminalise aggression – 
even though the adoption of the definition at Kampala represents some progress. 
The question is whether a revision of Nuremberg’s legacy has already started? We 
submit that the very inclusion of the crime against peace within the structure of the 
crime of aggression for purposes of the ICC necessitates such a revision – not for 
the sake of revision, but for the sake of future legal certainty. 
 
III. AGGRESSION UNDER THE ICC STATUTE POST KAMPALA 
 
 In spite of the controversy surrounding the legality of the Nuremberg trial, the 
legal and judicial precedents set by the law of Nuremberg and its trials did mark 
the “start of international criminal law stricto sensu”
63
which at least in theory 
applied to former victors and defeated alike: “while this law is first applied against 
German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must 
condemn, aggression by any other nations, including those who sit now in 
                                                          
59  See “Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in 
the Judgment of the Tribunal”, in Report of the International Law Commission Covering its 
Second Session, 5 Jun-29 Jul 1950, UN Doc. A/1316, 11-14. 
60  Cassese, supra note 44 at 157, see Tadic (Appeal), ICTY Appeals Chamber 15 July 1999 (case no 
IT-94-1-A) at paras 282-6 where the court confirms that the IMT among other international 
criminal law statutes (such as the ICTY and ICTR Statutes) form part of international law.  
61  R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16 
62  See authorities discussed by Gerhard Kemp, Individual Criminal Liability for the International 
Crime of Aggression (Belgium: Intersentia, 2010) at 144-148. 
63  Clauss Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, “The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of 
Aggression” (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1179 at 1180.  
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judgment”
64
 Some argue that the crime of aggression “was very much at the heart 
of” this historic moment.
65
 The unfinished business of adopting a definition of 
aggression for purposes of the Rome Statute (and ICC jurisdiction) therefore 
remained an ironic reminder of the progress, but also the difficulties, of 
international criminal law. The eventual adoption of a resolution on the crime of 
aggression at the Kampala Review Conference on the Rome Statute can be seen as 
an important confirmation and affirmation of the process that really started at 
Nuremberg. In historical terms, the Nuremberg to Kampala narrative should 
rightly be seen as one of the great epochs of international criminal law-making. 
But, as always, the devil is in the detail.  
 The definition of aggression (Article 8bis) and conditions for the exercise of 
ICC jurisdiction (Articles 15bis and 15ter)
66
 were adopted at Kampala in June 
2010.
67
 The adoption was preceded by a lengthy drafting process (conducted by a 
Special Working Group), which resulted in a report which was in turn adopted by 
the Assembly of States Parties in November 2009.
68
 The quality of the pre-
Kampala work was such that the Working Group report (as adopted by the 
Assembly of States Parties) was eventually adopted by the Review Conference at 
Kampala.
69
 The definition of aggression to be included in the Rome Statute reads 
as follows: 
 
Article 8bis 
Crime of aggression 
 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
                                                          
64  Justice R  Jackson in “Summary review of the Indictment and the Charter and their legal 
foundations” in Judgement 1: The Trial of German major war criminals, Proceedings of the 
International Military tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, (London: HM Stationary Office, 
1946) at 85. 
65  Ibid; Mohammed Aziz Shukri, “Individual Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression” in 
Roberto Bellelli, ed,  International Criminal Justice – Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to 
Its Review (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010) 519 at 529–530. 
66  For a discussion of the role of the Security Council see Bartlomiej Krzan “Frieden und 
Gerechtigkeit nach der Kampala-Konferenz: Einige Überlegungen zur Rolle des Sicherheitsrats in 
der Völkerstrafgerichtsbarkeit” (2010) 48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 467. 
67  See Res.RC/Res.6, advance version, 16 June 2010 online: International Criminal Court 
<www.icc-cpi.int>.  
68  For a comprehensive discussion of the drafting and diplomacy involved, see Kemp, supra note 62 
at 207-237. 
69  Kai Ambos “The crime of aggression after Kampala” (2010) 53 German Yearbook of 
International Law 463 at 467. 
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Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of 
war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act 
of aggression: 
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory 
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the 
territory of another State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed 
forces of another State; 
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the 
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving 
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed 
at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts 
listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.  
 
The above definition will not be analysed in detail here. For purposes of this 
contribution a number of relevant features will be discussed. In particular, the 
implications of the definition of aggression for the “post-9/11” world, as well as 
for possible responses to new Hybrid Threats to international peace and security 
will be pointed out.  
 It is clear from the text that the Kampala definition constitutes a marriage 
between Nuremberg and the 1974 General Assembly definition of aggression, with 
some modifications. Aggression under article 8bis is now a leadership crime par 
excellence.
70
 The language seems to suggest a stricter approach than the 
Nuremberg process, where individual liability was framed with reference to 
individuals who could “shape or influence policy”. “Effective control” (Article 
8bis (1)) could limit individual liability to the exclusion of individuals who, for 
instance, merely influenced policy.
71
 This view of “leadership”, combined with the 
state-centric approach to the crime of aggression, underscores the difficulty in 
                                                          
70  Art 8bis (1) read with art 25 (3bis); see analysis by Kemp supra note 62 at 236-237; Ambos, ibid 
at 468.  
71  Ambos, supra note 69 at 490. For a more nuanced view on “leadership”, see Kemp, supra note 62 
at 236-237. 
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extending the crime of aggression to “post-bureaucratic forms of organization as 
represented, for example, by paramilitary or terrorist non-State actors.”
72
  
 An important aspect of Article 8bis, paragraph 1 is the threshold qualification. 
The act that constitutes the “crime of aggression” must constitute by its character, 
gravity and scale a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
However, as pointed out by commentators,
73
 the individual conduct required in 
terms of the Kampala definition is more in line with the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
precedents, namely planning, preparation and initiation or execution. The 
qualitative aspect of Article 8bis (1) links the state act with the normative 
protection of the United Nations Charter against manifest violations, thus 
excluding minor incidents of violations of state sovereignty or “legally 
controversial cases” like humanitarian intervention from the ambit of the crime of 
aggression
74
 (for ICC purposes). But this qualitative aspect can be criticised as 
vague, perhaps too vague for purposes of criminalisation.
75
 However we agree with 
Ambos’s view, that “the lack of precision is embedded in the primary norm 
regulating the use of force.” Thus, “if it is not possible to clearly delimitate lawful 
from unlawful uses of force, how could the lines be drawn any more clearly at the 
level of the secondary norm criminalizing the unlawful use of force”
76
 (per Article 
8bis)?  
 The criminalization (under Article 8bis (1)) of the unlawful use of force is 
structurally linked to the use of force by a State, and this state-centric approach is 
underlined by the inclusion in Article 8bis (2) of reference to General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 on Aggression. Whilst broad support was given during the pre-
Kampala processes to the inclusion of Resolution 3314 in the definition of 
aggression,
77
 the eventual inclusion only confirms the pragmatic inclination of the 
negotiators and still does not “capture modern forms of aggression carried out by 
non-State actors in asymmetric conflicts”.
78
 The roots of this can arguably be 
traced to the debate about the scope of the 1974 Definition of Aggression itself. 
The recently independent states, members of the so-called Non-Alignment 
Movement [NUM], and the Soviet Union with its client-states, took the view that 
wars of national liberation were exceptions to UN Charter’s Article 2(4) 
prohibition of the use of force. The 1974 Definition thus incorporated the idea that 
people(s) can (and should legally be able to) struggle for self-determination – and 
                                                          
72  Ambos, supra note 69 at 492. 
73  Ibid at 468. 
74  Ibid at 482-483; Kemp, supra note 62 at 234 where the author argues that the criminalization of 
aggression for ICC purposes should “as closely as possible keep to the historical roots of the 
crime under international law – that is the criminalization of the jus contra bellum, and not mere 
(relatively) trivial international incidents or violations of international law.” Of course, the 
content of the jus contra bellum is not static, as is shown in this contribution.  
75  See generally, Sean D Murphy “Aggression, legitimacy and the International Criminal Court” 
(2009) 20 EJIL 1147 at 1147 and 1150-1151.  
76  Ambos, supra note 69 at 484. 
77  See discussion by Kemp, supra note 62 at218. 
78  Ambos, supra note 69 at 488. 
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this may include the use of armed force.
79
 Article 7 of the 1974 Definition reads as 
follows: 
 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular Article 3 [specific 
acts of aggression], could in any way prejudice the right to self-
determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to 
in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples 
under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien 
domination:  nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end 
and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the 
principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration. 
 
The contours of the debate about the definition of aggression for purposes of the 
International Criminal Court followed many of the same fault lines and divisions 
that informed the debate preceding the 1974 General Assembly Definition of 
Aggression. Ultimately, the specific acts of aggression as listed in Article 3 of the 
1974 Definition found their way into Article 8bis of the Kampala Resolution on 
Aggression, while Article 7 of the 1974 Definition did not. The various reports of 
the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (which did all the pre-
Kampala work on the draft definition of aggression and the draft conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression by the International Criminal 
Court) reflect the point of view of some states that all the articles in the 1974 
Definition of Aggression are interlinked and should thus form a unitary basis for 
the (at that stage) proposed definition of aggression for purposes of the ICC 
Statute. This apparent political approach (which was not so much concerned about 
the fact that the 1974 Definition was not drafted with individual criminal liability 
in mind) was ultimately rejected.
80
 The Kampala resolution on the definition of 
aggression thus reflects a more traditional state-centred approach to acts of 
aggression, without any explicit reference to exceptions for national liberation 
struggles and wars of national liberation.  
 Apart from the question about possible acts of aggression committed by non-
state actors, referred to above, a related future issue (in the context of ICC 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression) could be the question of acceptance of 
ICC jurisdiction by non-state actors and entities, such as national liberation 
movements or indeed non-states such as Palestine (on the assumption that this 
entity does not become a state and full member of the UN in the near future). The 
question of Palestinian statehood is a complex and ever evolving one,
81
 and not the 
focus of this contribution. However, against the background of that debate, it is 
                                                          
79  Kemp, supra note 62 at 67; Albrecht Randelzhofer  “Article 2(4)” in Bruno Simma, ed, The 
Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary 2nd Edition Vol 1(Oxford:  CH Beck 
Verlag/Oxford University Press, 2002) 112 at 128-129. 
80  Kemp, supra note 62 at 222. 
81  For a discussion, see Felix Dane & Ilona-Margarita Stettner “A Palestinian State in the United 
Nations?” in Stefan Burgdörfer, ed, International Reports, 8/11 (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2011) 51. 
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submitted that the state-centred jurisdictional regime of Article 12 of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC precludes ICC jurisdiction over situations where a non-state 
entity would on an ad hoc basis accept ICC jurisdiction – even where such an 
entity (for instance a national liberation movement or even an entity in statu 
nascendi) would be in de facto control of a certain territory. We agree with the 
sensible conclusion of Yaël Ronen: 
 
Interpreting Article 12(3) more widely to include entities 
effectively governing non-sovereign territory also seems 
unwarranted, as such interpretation flies in the face of the ICC 
Statute’s wording and the intention of its drafters. Any 
involvement in issues of recognition risks exposing the 
Prosecutor and the Court to accusations of politicization and 
subjectivity.
82
 
 
If individual criminal liability for aggression is the aim of Article 8bis (as indeed it 
is), then we agree, in principle, with Ambos that essentially the crime of 
aggression “is not so much determined by the actor but by the wrongfulness of the 
act.
83
 Of course that brings us back to the fundamental debate about the content of 
the jus ad bellum, and the meaning of wrongfulness, the questions at the heart of 
this contribution. Article 8bis (2) is clearly not aimed at non-state acts of 
aggression. It is also not wise or permissible under criminal law doctrine to extend 
the list by way of analogy.
84
 Is the answer perhaps to first tackle the first norm – 
the prohibition of the use of force – and then get back to the secondary norm – the 
criminalization of the unlawful use of force? That would be in line with the 
approach first taken at Nuremberg (albeit controversially as pointed out above) 
and later essentially repeated at Kampala, although this time on sound legal and 
political ground.  
 So what are these future challenges and how would they impact on our 
understanding of the modern “crime against peace”; the crime of aggression? 
 
IV. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON FUTURE MILITARY 
CHALLENGES AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE NOTION OF 
THE USE OF FORCE AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
 
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of 
radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and 
biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile 
technology-when that occurs, even weak states and small groups 
could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our 
enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught 
seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to 
                                                          
82  Yaël Ronen “ICC jurisdiction over acts committed in the Gaza Strip – Article 12(3) of the ICC 
Statute and Non-state entities” (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 at 26-27. 
83  Ibid. 
84  See also comments by Ambos, supra note 69 at 489 and Kemp, supra note 62 at 236.  
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blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends-and we will 
oppose them with all our power.
85
 
 
This article concludes with a sobering prediction: it is the opinion of the authors 
that the present legal concepts on the use of military force, the jus ad bellum, have 
become relatively anachronistic, if not partially outdated 20
th
 century concepts 
which will not suffice when dealing with the present security threats and 
challenges of the 21
st
 century. The above quote from the National Security 
Strategy of 2002 was designed to authorize former US president George Bush’s 
Administration to take pre-emptive action whenever the “United States cannot 
remain idle while dangers gather”
86
and meant to counter threats involving the use 
of WMDs
87
 by rogue states and armed terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The 
emergence of new threats makes an extension of this doctrine not unlikely. 
 Hybrid attack scenarios (combining a multitude of low intensity and even 
“virtual” threats),
88
 non-state threats in the developing world including asymmetric 
war scenarios (from international terrorism to piracy) new fifth dimensional 
threats such as cyber warfare, and finally frequent humanitarian intervention 
scenarios (albeit under a different name) in response to human rights disasters at a 
massive scale (caused by environmental and political/religious forces) will 
significantly influence the way we perceive present concepts and doctrines of the 
legality of the use of military force in contemporary politics and question our 
traditional focus on state aggression as a condition for the exercise of self-defence 
in terms of Article 51 United Nations Charter.
89
 
 To highlight some of these future threats to international peace and security we 
would like to use the example of cyber war in a so called “Hybrid Threats” 
scenario. Cyber War
90
 basically refers to a sustained computer-based cyber-attack 
by a state (or non-state actor) against the IT - infrastructure of a target state: an 
example of such hostile action taking place in the fifth dimension of warfare is the 
2007 Russian attempt to virtually block out Estonia’s internet infrastructure as a 
unilateral countermeasure and retribution for Estonia’s removal of a WW II Soviet 
                                                          
85  The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, of 17 Sep 
2002” online: White House <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss> at 17.  
86  Ibid at 19.  
87  Weapons of mass destruction, refers to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
88
  The author Bachmann is part of NATO’s hybrid threat study group which met in 2011 in Tallinn, 
Estonia and Brussels, Belgium for a workshop meetings on these new type of threats, see supra 
note 10. His work focuses on the complementarity of “kinetic” and alternative forms of 
deterrence for aiders and abettors of international terrorism in a hybrid threat context discussing 
the impact and effect of “lethal” and “non-lethal” responses, see e.g. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, 
“Terrorism Litigation As Deterrence Under International Law – From Protecting Human Rights 
to Countering Hybrid Threats” (2011) 87 Amicus Curiae 22 and also “Hybrid Threats, cyber 
warfare and NATO’s comprehensive approach for countering 21st century threats – mapping the 
new frontier of global risk and security management” (2012) 88 Amicus Curiae 14. 
89  International Court of Justice “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied 
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cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=5a&case=131&code=mwp&p3=4>  
90  See generally, Jenny Döge “Cyber Warfare. Challenges for the Applicability of the Traditional 
Laws of War Regime” (2010) 48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 486. 
 Vol. 30(1)  “Organized Hypocrisy?” - The Nuremberg Legacy 251 
 
War Memorial from the centre of Tallinn.
91
 Governmental and party websites as 
well as businesses were severely hampered by this incident of cyber warfare. This 
incident of using cyber assets was followed by the employment of such cyber 
measures in connection with the Russian military campaign in Georgia in 2008. 
The most recent report on the use of a sophisticated use of a virus/worm to 
sabotage Iran’s nuclear weapons programmes, called Stuxnet, by presumably 
Israel, has highlighted both the technical advancement, possibilities as well as 
potential of such new means of conducting hostile actions in the fifth dimension of 
warfare.
92
 The continuing and intensifying employment of such cyber-attacks by 
China against the USA, NATO, the European Union and the rest of the world has 
led the USA to respond by establishing a central Cyber War Command, the United 
States Cyber Command [USCYBERCOM] in 2010
93
 to “conduct full-spectrum 
military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure 
US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our 
adversaries.”
94
 Following these developments and – perhaps supplementing the 
work of USCYBERCOM - NATO set up a special hybrid threat study group 
which is studying possible responses to such threats, the so called NATO Transnet 
network on Countering Hybrid Threats [CHT].
95
  
 The repercussions for international lawyers in terms of possible responses to 
such challenges are significant and have not yet been discussed in terms of their 
full possible impact for the way we define war and peace within the concept of 
armed attack and individual and collective self-defence in terms of Articles 51, 2 
(4) United Nations Charter, Article 5 NATO Treaty etc.  
 The authors are convinced that the definitions of the nature of an armed attack 
will change even further than already witnessed in the aftermath of 9/11
96
 and will 
eventually give rise to a significant change in the present body of international law 
regulating the jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
97
 Referring to and reflecting on the 
above cited US National Security Strategy [NSS]
98
 and a recent analysis by 
Professor von Heintschel Heinegg
99
on the consequences of asymmetric warfare for 
the (wider) law of armed conflict, one quite likely consequence may be that we 
will witness the future use of military force to counter such cyber-attacks (and 
                                                          
91  See Ian Traynor, “Russian accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia”, The Guardian (17 
May 2007) online: Guardian Unlimited <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/top-
stories3.russia>. 
92  Christopher Williams, “Stuxnet: Cyber attack on Iran ‘was carried out by Western powers and 
Israel’”, The Telegraph (21 January 2011) online: The Telegraph 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8274009/Stuxnet-Cyber-attack-on-Iran-was-carried-out-
by-Western-powers-and-Israel.html>. 
93  With the decision taken in 2009, and initial operational capability as of 2010, see online: United 
States Strategic Command <http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/Cyber_Command/>. 
94  Ibid. 
95  See supra note 10. 
96  See above for the 9/12 UN SC Res which qualified the terrorist attacks as armed attack thus 
“authorising” the use of military force among other means. 
97  C.f. Article 49 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 
entered into force Dec. 7, 1978. 
98  The White House, supra note 85 at 15.   
99  W H Heinegg, “Assymetric Warfare” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
online: Max Planck Encyclopedia <http://www. mpepil.com>. 
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other Hybrid Threats) directed against “hostile” (aka enemy infrastructure), as 
well as individual high profile targets of  both state and non-state actor quality. 
 Linked to this observation is a cultural dimension which may see the 
development of a legal perception which differs from the existing, mostly western, 
historically founded view on the question on the legality of the use of force. The 
21
st
 century will be the century of new global players (with China and India as re-
emerged global powers) exercising their own brand of economic and military 
might: their cultural and strategic outlook and understanding on the discussed 
concepts will determine the fate of the present state of affairs: whether our 
Western shaped concepts of peace and security and the legacy of Nuremberg will 
prevail.  
 The above mentioned “Jasmine” revolution will have far reaching 
consequences for the Maghreb region as such: whether the “Arab spring” will 
herald the advent of democracy, peace and stability in the region has to be seen. 
While these events have not led to a – much feared - strengthening of the most 
violent and radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda, other fundamental non 
secular Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria as 
well as Al-Nahda in Tunisia have significantly gained in terms of public support. 
The on-going detente between Hamas in Gaza and Al Fatah in the West Bank is a 
direct consequence of these events and may impact the future of Palestinian - 
Israeli affairs. The Palestinian - Israeli conflict will see a new phase where the 
West’s open support for the Arab spring will dictate new “rules of engagement” 
when dealing with Palestinian rights and positions: new expectations have been 
created with the potential of possible violent conflict scenarios arising from 
disappointment as well as from the re-emergence of suppressed ethnic and 
religious rivalries within the region.  
 Concluding, one can observe that Hybrid Threats, low threshold regional 
conflicts, as well as asymmetric conflict scenarios which have little in common 
with traditional 20th century warfare, will be more frequent in this century and 
will require means and ways of “flexible responsiveness” through escalating levels 
of confrontation and assets deployed. Future military roles and operations taking 
place in so called “steady state” environment conflict scenarios will be more 
flexible in terms of choice of military assets and objectives, but also more 
frequent. The present concepts of “crisis management” responses will develop 
further into more pronounced military roles and responsibilities of a more 
“dynamic” nature. One potential casualty of these new threats might be the infant 
definition of aggression as adopted at the Kampala Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Kampala definition (which 
might not even ever enter into force because of a lack of ratifications) is, all legal 
and political matters considered, as good a definition as can be expected for the 
complex crime of aggression. However, in a very real sense the Kampala 
Definition is also a snapshot of the politico-legal realities of the 20
th
 century. By 
not providing for non-state actors in the list of acts of aggression, the Kampala 
Definition will be at the mercy of new and Hybrid Threats to peace and security. 
To the extent that the Kampala Definition can be viewed as a culmination (or 
confirmation) of the legacy of Nuremberg, the inherent weakness with respect to 
new and Hybrid Threats might be the 21
st
 century equivalent of the international 
and domestic legal apathy and inaction that threatened and undermined the so-
called legacy of Nuremberg.  
